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This paper investigates whether gender gaps in student achievement are related to evaluation schemes. 
We exploit different evaluations at the end of compulsory education in Norway in a difference-in-
difference framework. Compared to scores at anonymously evaluated central exit exams, girls get 
significantly higher grades than boys when assessed by their teacher. We find no evidence that the 
competitiveness of the environment can explain why boys do relatively better at the exam. The gender 
grading gap is related to teacher characteristics. The results indicate that the teacher-student interaction 
during coursework favor girls in the teacher grading. 
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Mechtenberg (2009) presents a game theoretical model in which gender gaps in equilibrium 
are similar to observed gender differences in school achievement, university enrolment, and 
wages. In her model, there are two subjects at school - mathematics and humanities – and 
students’ beliefs about own ability depend on teacher grading. The crucial assumption for the 
fascinating equilibrium is that girls do not fully trust bad grades in humanities and good 
grades in mathematics, while boys do not fully trust good grades in humanities. Teachers 
respond to these beliefs by easy grading for boys in humanities and for girls in mathematics, 
and hard grading for girls in humanities. Thus, the central theorem in Mechtenberg (2009) is 
the existence of a significant gender grading bias against girls in humanities and a smaller 
gender grading bias against boys in mathematics. This  theorem is testable by comparing 
teacher grading with external evaluation of achievement.
1 
The present paper exploits  achievement scores for Norwegian students at the end of 
compulsory schooling. Teachers set grades based on tests given throughout the whole school 
year, and all students conduct a central exit exam that is graded anonymously. All grades 
matter for admission to upper secondary schools and are in this respect high-stake.  
The observed gender gap in student achievement  in favor of girls is often explained by 
increased share of female teachers. For example Dee (2005a, 2005b) and Ammermueller and 
Dolton (2006) find evidence that students profit from having same-sex teacher. Steel (1997) 
discusses a phenomenon referred to as “stereotype threats” as an explanation of how 
demographic matches between students and teachers may influence educational outcomes. 
The idea is that students’ academic self-confidence,  and  therefore their  performance, is 
limited by possible and perceived stereotypes in the classroom. Another potential explanation, 
often referred to as “role-model” effects, is that the presence of a demographically similar 
teacher may raise students’ academic motivation and expectations, and thus positively affects 
performance. 
Both stereotype threats and role-model effects are “passive” teacher effects since they are not 
related to intentional  behavior of teachers. Thus, passive teacher effects cannot explain 
                                                 
1 As students’ expectations adjust to the grading signals, easy grading has a negative effect on achievement in 
equilibrium. This feature of the model is in line with the empirical evidence on easy grading, see for example 
Figlio and Lucas (2004) and Bonesrønning (2004, 2008). 3 
 
systematic differences in performance across evaluation schemes as far as they test the same 
skills.  
The hypothesis in Lavy (2008) is that schools and teachers are sources of stereotypes that 
harm girls. The hypothesis is tested by exploiting that the matriculation exam in the academic 
track at Israeli high schools consists of both a state exam which is anonymously graded and 
an internal school exam. Contrary to the hypothesis, Lavy (2008) find that the bias on the 
non-blind test is against boys in all subjects.  
Compared to the exam system in Israel, the potential for discrimination is higher in countries 
where teacher grading is based on more than a single test. The findings of Emanuelsson and 
Fischbein (1986), Stobart et al. (1992), Lindahl (2007a), and Bonesrønning (2008) indicate 
that greater weight on coursework elements improves the relative performance of girls. 
Machin and McNally (2005) show that the gender gap in the UK aroused in the afterwards of the 
change in examination system in 1988. The importance of coursework increased in the new system. 
We find that girls obtain better scores than boys in teacher grading relative to the central exit 
exam in both mathematics, English, and Norwegian language in the period 2002‒2005. Thus, 
our results are not in accordance with Mechtenberg’s (2009) central theorem. The gender 
grading gaps estimated, however, are of the same magnitude as found by Lavy (2008). Other 
mechanisms than those put  forward by Mechtenberg (2009) must explain the grading 
behavior. We investigate whether the finding in Gneezy et al. (2003) that males perform 
relative better in competitive environments can explain the gender gap. We explore that the 
extent  to which grades matter for admission to upper secondary education varies across 
counties, and, in addition, that one specific cohort conducted a separate low-stake test. The 
results indicate that the  competitiveness of the  environments  cannot explain the  gender 
grading gaps. In addition, the results for the low-stake test indicate that the gaps are not 
related to the anonymous vs. non-anonymous dimension. However, we find some evidence 
that the gender of the teacher and teacher experience matter for the gender grading gaps..The 
teacher-student relationship seems important, although with a different kind of interaction 
than assumed by Mechtenberg (2009). We conclude that the most reasonable explanation for 
the gender grading gaps is that teacher grades are based on performance over a longer period 
than single tests. Teacher grades might include coursework elements that favor girls. 4 
 
The next section offers a more closely description of the Norwegian educational system and 
student evaluation schemes. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 includes the main results on 
gender grading gap in teacher assessments, while in Section 5 some investigations on possible 
explanations of the observed gender gap are discussed. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Institutional Setting 
Norway has 10 years of compulsory schooling (from the year children turn six to the year 
they turn 16). None repeat grades, which implies that every student reach the 10
th grade. 
Multi-purpose municipalities are responsible for the schools, and assign students to schools 
according to neighborhood rules. In 2005, 1164 public schools provided education at the 
lower secondary level (8
th to 10
th grade).  
At the end of lower secondary education, students are evaluated both non-anonymously by 
their teachers (grades given in all curricula-based subjects) and anonymously in central exit 
exams. Each student conducts one central written exam of five hours, which take place at the 
end of the final year. The Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training prepares the 
written central exams, while local authorities are responsible for the assignment of 
examination subjects to schools and individual students  given clear instructions from the 
Directorate. The teachers or schools have no influence in this respect. The students, as well as 
the schools, are informed about their exam subject on the same day all over the country, and 
the exam is 2-7 days later depending on exam subject. About 20 percent of the students are 
examined in Norwegian, about 40 percent are examined in mathematics, and 40 percent in 
English.
2 The exam result is determined by two external examiners assigned to each student.  
Teacher grading is the responsibility of individual teachers. According to the school law, 
teacher grade should be based on the achievements throughout the school year, and should 
express the students’ competence and skills.  Grades shall not reflect student effort. In 
Norwegian language and English, there are separate marks for written and oral skills, where 
the former is based on tests and the latter on performance in class. We compare the former 
with the exam results because they shall measure the same skills. In fact, teachers often use 
questions from former exams in their tests, and as a part of the basis for their evaluation is a 
                                                 
2 Students with exam in the Norwegian language had the exam over two days in the empirical period. There are 
two formal written Norwegian languages, and the students conducted exam in both, and got separate grades from 
their teachers in both. In this paper we only consider the results for the main Norwegian language.   5 
 
one-day test of five hours. Although the performance throughout the whole school year matter, 
the performance in the latest tests is most important. In central exam subjects, teacher grades 
should be given at least one day before the notification of exam results. 
Teacher grades and central exam results are equally important for students’ final grade point 
average (GPA). GPA matters for the prospects of admission to upper secondary study tracks 
and schools. There is a legal right of upper secondary schooling. Over 95 percent of the 
cohort enrolls the year they finish compulsory education. Upper secondary education is the 
responsibility of the counties, which determines location of schools and the composition of 
study tracks at each school. About 45 percent enroll  in the academic study  track  which 
qualifies for higher education. In addition, during the empirical period of this paper, there 
were 12 vocational study tracks, which at graduation certify for work as electrician, carpenter, 
practical nurse, etc. Most schools have several study tracks. 
In their application, students have to rank three different study tracks. They have a legal right 
to be enrolled into one of these three tracks, but whether they are enrolled in the first, second, 
or third preferred track depends on GPA. No other factors matter. Teacher grades and the 
result on the exit exam is high-stake in this respect. In addition, in some counties there is free 
school choice. Students have to rank schools in addition to study tracks in their application, 
and admission to over-subscribed schools is solely based on GPA. Other counties rely on 
school catchment areas; the students are enrolled in the closest school with the preferred study 
track.
3 Thus, GPA is high-stake to a larger degree in counties with free school choice than in 
counties using well-defined school catchment areas, a feature that we exploit in the analysis 
below.  
A national student evaluation scheme was implemented in the spring 2004. All final grade 
students  had to conduct tests  in all three  exam  subjects. The tests  were  designed  as 
instruments to evaluate and monitor performance and to provide feedback to municipalities, 
schools, and teachers. The tests were evaluated by the student’s teacher, but the results should 
not be taken into consideration when the teachers decided on final grades. The tests had thus 
no consequences for the students. The testing time was short, about one hour, and the content 
of the test could differ from the skills tested in the high-stake assessments. In particular, the 
test in Norwegian did not include writing an essay. It was a test of reading skills. 
                                                 
3 A closer description of one system of free school choice is given in Machin and Salvanes (2010). They study 
the effect on house prices of increased school choice from 1997 in the Oslo county. 6 
 
According to Borghans et al. (2006), individual effort and achievement depend on the reward 
related to the result. Student evaluation schemes can in general differ along three dimensions. 
They can be anonymous or non-anonymous, based on a single test or the performance over a 
longer period, or influence individual students’ prospects (high-stake tests) or not (low-stake 
tests).
4 Table 1 classifies possible evaluation schemes into six different types.
5 In this paper 
we exploit three of the evaluation types as indicated in bold in the table. Possible tests of other 
kinds are indicated in the table.  
 
3.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Information on students and teachers in lower secondary schools is provided by Statistics 
Norway. Data on teacher grades and results from the central exit exam are available for the 
cohorts graduating in the spring 2002–2005, while results for the national test are available 
only for  2004. The data are merged with extensive information on individual student 
background, such as gender and immigration status, and parents’ income, marital status and 
education. Information on teachers includes gender, teaching experience, marital status, and 
number of children. The teacher information is aggregated to the school level and merged 
with student level data using a school identifier.  
There are several mixed schools with students at 1
st to 10
th grade that typically are small and 
located in rural areas. Since information on whether teachers work at the primary or lower 
secondary level is not available, we exclude mixed schools from the sample to avoid linking 
primary school teachers to students at the lower secondary level. This reduces the sample by 
24 percent.
6 Since our identification is based on within-student variation in achievement, the 
                                                 
4 Low-stake tests include several  instruments  to monitor school, school district, or country performance. 
International comparative achievement tests (like PISA and TIMMS) that are widely used in empirical work are 
low-stake tests by nature, which to a large extent also is the case for the grades in US high school since 
admission to colleges mainly rely on the SAT test conducted after graduating from high school. In contrast, in 
most European countries, admission to higher education institutions is based on grades set by teachers. Test 
results may also involve economic incentives for the schools and school owners and in some sense be high-sake 
tests for the schools, while, at the same time, low-stake tests for the students. Evaluations of the reliability of 
tests used in accountability systems include Kane and Staiger (2002), Jacob and Levitt (2003), and, Jacob, 
(2007). 
5 Our classification into three dimensions indicates that there are eight different types of evaluation schemes (4 x 
2 table). However, it is hard to imagine anonymous evaluations based on observations over a longer time period. 
6 In models that do not include information of teachers, the results for the main parameter of interest are very 
similar in the full sample and in our regression sample. The estimate on the full sample is 1‒12 percent larger 
(depending on subject) than the results for our regression sample reported below. 7 
 
estimation sample only includes students with both a teacher grade and an exam result in a 
given subject.
7 Each student is only observed in one subject.  
Both teacher grading and exams use a grading scale from 1 to 6, where score 6 is best and 1 is 
very weak. Figure 1 presents the distribution of scores across assessment schemes, subjects, 
and gender. A score of 3 or 4 is most common, each including 20 to 40 percent of the students 
in the different groups. The distributions are close to normal in all cases, although there are 
two distinct patterns. First, the scores are always better in teacher grading than at exam. 
Obviously, several students get a lower score at the exam than when they are assessed by their 
teacher.  Second,  female students perform better than male students in languages, and in 
particular in Norwegian.   
Table 2 and 3 cross-tabulates the percentages with the different combinations of scores at the 
exam and the teacher grading in mathematics for female and male students, respectively. It is 
most common to get the same score in both evaluation schemes. However, several students 
get one grade lower at the exam than in the teacher assessment. For example, out of the 29.1 
percent of girls with teacher grade equal to 4, 34.4 percent got score 3 at the exam (that is 
10.0 percent of the total sample of girls). The figures are similar for boys, but with a tendency 
that fewer students get a lower score at the exam. Overall, 58.9 percent of the girls and 60.6 
percent of the boys get the same result in the two evaluation schemes, and 32.6 and 29.2 
percent, respectively, get lower score at the exam than in the teacher assessment.  
Table 4 compares mean scores in teacher grading and exam across gender. For each subject, 
the table report average  teacher  grades, exam results, and  the test-statistic from a mean 
comparison test across gender and evaluation schemes. Average score is higher for female 
students than for male students in all cases, and the differences are statistically significant. 
The  gender gap is  largest in Norwegian and small  in  mathematics.  In contrast to most 
countries, girls outperform boys even in mathematics. This is in line with the findings in for 
example the international comparative student  test of eight graders TIMSS 2003, see for 
example Fryer and Levitt (2009). Guiso et al. (2008) argue that the gender achievement gap in 
mathematics is related to gender equality in general, and in the most gender-equal societies 
girls perform at least as well as boys.  
                                                 
7 Some students are exempted from the external exam because of illness on examination day, disabilities, etc. 
The written exam absence rate is close to 4 percent each year. 8 
 
Table 4 also shows that average scores in teacher grading are higher than exam scores in all 
cases. The last column for each subject shows that the differences are of about the same size 
in all subjects and  statistically  significant.  In addition, the score differences between the 
assessment schemes are higher for girls than for boys. The simple difference-in-difference 
estimator, corresponding to parameter γ in equation (1) below, is equal to 0.05, 0.07, and 0.02 
in mathematics, English, and Norwegian, respectively, and significant at 5 percent level in all 
cases. 
Appendix Table A1 reports descriptive statistics. The first column includes all students, and 
the statistics for the “score”-variable merge all subjects. Regarding student characteristics, 69 
percent are living with both parents, about 30 percent of the parents have some college or 
university education. Teacher characteristics are only available as year specific averages at the 
school level. 54 percent of the teachers are women at the lower secondary level,
8 64 percent 
are married and 18 percent do not have children. 
In the last three columns in Appendix Table A1, only the individuals conducted the relevant 
exam is included. Each student only takes one exam. Overall, there are very small differences 
in background characteristics across the subjects, even though at many schools it is the case 
that all students have the same exam subject. This clearly support that allocation of exam 
subject across students is random. 
 
4. Gender gap in teacher grading 
4.1  Empirical strategy 
We follow Lavy (2008) and estimate the following linear difference-in-difference model. 
(1)  ( ) +x =+ + + +++ Eijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt j t Eijt A G E EG X αλ δ γ β φ µσ, 
where the score  Eijt A  at evaluation E (E=1 for teacher grading and E=0 for central exam) of 
student  i  at  school  j  at time t is assumed to be a function of gender G  and the type of 
evaluation E. Each student is observed at one point in time, at the end of 10
th grade. The 
model includes co-variates Xijt (as reported in Appendix Table A1), and school and time fixed 
                                                 
8 In contrast, at the primary level there is clearly a majority of female teachers. For mixed schools (1
st–10
th 
grade), there are 65 percent female teachers. 9 
 
effects,  ϕj  and t µ ,  respectively.  Eijt σ  is an i.i.d. error term. Since the data set is stacked, 
including both the  teacher  grade  and the exam result, the number of observations in the 
regression will be twice the number of students. We estimate the model separately for each 
subject, and, in addition, we estimate a model including all subjects. The latter will return the 
average effects across the three different subjects. 
The difference-in-difference parameter γ  identifies the mean gender difference in score gaps. 
A positive γ  indicates that female students, conditional on the individual exam result, receive 
higher grades from their teachers than male students. The parameters λ  and δ  identify the 
gender achievement gap at the exam and the “grade inflation” for male students in the teacher 
grading, respectively.  
In this model, all individual and school fixed effects are implicitly assumed away with regard 
to the parameter γ , as long as these effects are homogenous across evaluation schemes. In 
essence γ  is identified on the difference between the teacher grade  and the exam result. 
Estimating γ  from (1) is algebraically identical to estimating γ from the equation  
(2)  1, 0, + == − =∆ = +∆ E ijt E ijt ijt ijt ijt AA A G δγ σ. 
Equation (2) highlights that including co-variates and time fixed effects in equation (1) does 
not influence the estimate of γ  because the basic specification saturates all these effects. 
However, one advantage by estimating (1) is that more coefficients are revealed.  
Consistency of the difference-in-difference parameter γ  requires that assignment of female 
students  to schools is  not systematically related to teacher grading practices. Systematic 
assignment of students with respect to gender is very unlikely in the Norwegian system 
basically with fixed school catchment areas. However, we will take into account that schools 
may be heterogeneous with respect to teacher grading practices, peer effects due to different 
student  composition, unobserved teacher quality, etc.,  by including school fixed effects 
interacted with the assessment scheme. This is identical to include school fixed effects in 
equation (2). When we estimate the model at differenced form as in equation (2), we will also 
present results from model specifications including student and teacher characteristics.  10 
 
4.2  Results 
Table 5 presents results using the model specification described in equation (1). The first 
model includes all students and thus merges data across subjects, while the rest of the table 
presents results separately for the three subjects. The table only reports the parameters of main 
interest. Full results are provided in Appendix Table A2. The appendix table shows, as 
expected,  that  immigrants have lower scores than native students in all subjects, and the 
scores are highest for students with highly educated parents living together. The effects of 
teacher characteristics are imprecisely estimated, presumably because they are measured at 
the school level and the models include school fixed effects.  
The results  in Table 5  are very similar to the mean comparison tests in Table  4. The 
differences between the first columns for each subject and the tests in Table 4 are related to 
some missing observations of student characteristics. The differences in standard errors are 
mainly related to clustering of errors at the school level. The mean achievement gap (as 
measured by the exam) is 0.30 score points at average across all subjects. The average grade 
inflation in teacher grading is 0.17 score points.  
The effect of main interest, the interaction effect between the dummy variables for female 
student and teacher grading, is positive in all regressions. Female students are on average 
rewarded significantly better by their teachers, relative to the exam, than male students. The 
average gender grading gap across all subjects is 0.05 score points, and highly significant. The 
gap is largest in mathematics and English, and barely significant in Norwegian. The fact that 
the gap is not sensitive to the inclusion of interactions with school fixed effects indicates that 
teacher grading is not related to student or teacher sorting across schools. 
The size of the interaction effects can be evaluated relative to the standard deviation of the 
distribution of the score difference between the assessment schemes.
9 The estimated effects in 
mathematics and English correspond to about 0.09 standard deviations, while in Norwegian 
the effect is about 0.02 standard deviations.  The former effects are in line with Lavy’s (2008) 
results, while the latter is smaller. Given the differences in assessment schemes analyzed in 
this paper compared to the schemes analyzed by Lavy (2008), we would expect that the 
gender  gap  would be larger in our  case. While Lavy compare two single day tests, we 
                                                 
9 The mean score differences [standard deviation] between teacher grades and the central exit exam results are 
0.197 [0.693] across all subjects, 0.228 [0.636] in mathematics, 0.162 [0.712] in English, and 0.195 [0.765] in 
Norwegian. 11 
 
compare the externally graded test with assessment based on performance over the whole 
school year, leaving more room for teacher-student interactions to have an impact. 
The results discussed here are not in line with the equilibrium conditions in Mechtenberg’s 
(2009) cheap-talk-in-the-classroom model. We do not observe a grading gap against girls in 
humanities. We have two language subjects in our analysis, and the grading gap is against 
boys in both cases. The grading gap against boys in mathematics is in accordance with 
Mechtenberg’s model, but the driving force in her model is that treatment and responses to 
treatment differ across subjects. 
 
5. What can explain the gender gap in teacher grading? 
We consider two possible explanations of the observed grading gap against boys. First, it is 
arguably a more competitive environment at an exit exam than at tests taken throughout the 
school year, and we will investigate whether this can explain why males do relatively better at 
the exam than in teacher grading. Second, even though the specific story of the teacher-
student interaction of Mechtenberg (2009) is not supported by the data, the interaction may 
take other forms.  
5.1 Gender grading gap and competitiveness of the environment 
Gneezy et al. (2003) designed an experiment to investigate performance under different 
incentive schemes. Their findings suggest that women are  less effective than men in 
competitive environments. In addition, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that females are 
less willing than men to enter a mixed-sex competition. Some evidence also exists from real 
life data. Paserman (2007) studies Grand Slam tennis tournaments and finds that women are 
significantly more likely than men to hit unforced errors at the crucial stages of the match. Örs 
et al. (2008) examine an entry exam to a very selective French business school, and find that 
males do relatively better than females on the exam compared to prior achievement.  
We will investigate whether gender differences in response to competition can explain the 
observed gender grading gap in our data in two ways. Firstly we will exploit that GPA matters 
more in some counties than in other counties. Secondly we to compare the exam result to the 
one-day low-stake national tests in 2004. 12 
 
If the observed gender grading gap is due to a more competitive environment at the exam than 
at the events relevant for the teacher grade, we would expect the grading gap to be larger in 
counties with free school choice than in counties with only free choice related to study track, 
i.e., girls perform relatively worse at the exam under free school choice. According to the 
classification of Haraldsvik (2004), seven counties had free school choice in the empirical 
period (including Oslo), 10 counties had fixed school catchment areas (including Bergen, the 
second largest city in the country), while two counties had free school choice in the cities and 
not outside cities. The systems are represented all over the country. The casual evidence 
indicates that the variation in school choice across counties is mostly historical. Even though 
school choice has an ideological bias, there are few changes over the last 20 years.
10 In 11 
municipalities, mainly medium sized cities, there was a mixed system. We skip these 
observations from the analysis below (six percent of the observations). Appendix Table A1 
shows that there where free school choice for 55 percent of the observations. 
Table 6 presents models estimating different version of equation (2) above. The model in 
column (1) is identical to the model in column (2) in Table 5, except that the model includes 
the interaction term between gender and free school choice.
11 Contrary to the hypothesis, the 
gender grading gap is smaller when there is free school choice. In the case of catchment areas 
female students achieve on average, relative to male students, 0.059 score points better in 
teacher grading than at the exam, while with free school choice the gender grading gap is 
0.040 score points. Female students thus perform relatively better at the exam in areas with 
free school choice. The difference is significant at five percent level. The model in column (2) 
in Table 6  includes time fixed effects and student and teacher characteristics, without 
affecting the estimated gender grading gaps.  
One can argue that school choice is always limited in rural areas. Thus, in column (3) in Table 
6, we exclude observations in small municipalities classified as having free school choice. 
This does not change the results. Finally, in column (4) we restrict the sample to the two 
largest cities. The results indicate that the gender grading gap in Bergen, with well-defined 
catchment areas, is 0.10 score points in favor of girls, about twice the country average. But 
most interestingly, the grading gap is significantly smaller in Oslo in which there is free 
                                                 
10 Some changes occur. Oslo changed from a mixed system to a system of free choice in 1997, see Machin and 
Salvanes (2010). In the city of Trondheim the exact opposite change was implemented after the empirical period 
of this paper, while more choice has been introduced in Bergen.  The arguments for changes are typically 
ideological, and are indeed not related to gender differences.  
11 Notice that the level effect of free school choice is not identified since the model include school fixed effects. 13 
 
school choice. The grading gap in Oslo is estimated to 0.035 score points, close to the average 
of counties with free school choice. 
The last columns in Table 6 show that the gender grading gap is related to school choice in 
mathematics and Norwegian, while the interaction term is small and insignificant in English. 
The subject specific regressions test whether there is a gender grading gap in six different 
cases; three subjects under two different degrees of the stakes. With choice only over study 
track, there is a grading gap against boys in all three subjects. With free choice both for study 
tracks and schools, there is a grading gap against boys in mathematics and English, but not in 
Norwegian. The latter yields the low average gender grading gap revealed in Table 5.   
Table 7 compares the exam results to the one-day low-stake national tests.
12 It turns out that 
female students have a relatively lower score at the low-stake test than at the exam. This result 
is also contrary to the hypothesis that girls perform less well in competitive environments. 
The gender gap in absolute value is about twice the observed gender grading gap in Table 5. It 
turns out that the average gender gap is sizable particularly in Norwegian. This result must be 
interpreted with caution since the low-stake test in Norwegian focused on reading and thus 
tested somewhat different skills than the exam. The results for Norwegian can be interpreted 
as boys are relatively better in reading than in writing. However, there is also a large gender 
gap in mathematics which is clearly  not in accordance with the competitiveness of the 
environment hypothesis.  
Table 7 also includes models in which the female dummy variable is interacted with whether 
there is free school choice in the county. Since the difference in stakes is arguable higher 
under free school choice, the hypothesis above implies that the interaction effects are positive. 
The results indicate relatively low power for this test. Lower power in the model for the 
national test than in the model for teacher grading is probably related to smaller sample. 
Nevertheless, the point estimate in column (3) in Table 7 does not support the hypothesis. 
However, restricting the sample by excluding small municipalities classified as having free 
school choice, changes the sign of the interaction term. In particular in Norwegian it seems 
like girls are doing relatively better on the low-stake test in counties with free school choice 
                                                 
12 The grading scale was different for the national test. In order to facilitate comparability, we impose the same 
mean and standard deviation for the national test as for the exam. Since data is only available for one year, 
teacher characteristics are collinear to the school fixed effects. 14 
 
than in other counties.
13 However, giving the high standard errors, no conclusions can be 
drawn concerning the effect of free school choice.  
Overall, conditional on the high-stake central exit exam, boys outperform girls on the low-
stake national one-day test. Thus, the hypothesis that girls perform relatively worse when 
stakes are high is not supported.
14  
These  results  also  indicate  that  the  anonymous vs. non-anonymous  dimension of the 
evaluations schemes is not important for the gender grading gap. Both teacher grading and the 
national tests are non-anonymous, but while the female grading gap is positive for the former, 
it is negative for the latter.  
5.2 Gender grading gap and teacher-student interaction 
Inspired by the literature on gender stereotypes and student–teacher gender interactions (e.g., 
Steel, 1997; Dee, 2005b; Ammermueller and Dolton, 2006), we  investigate whether the 
observed gender grading gap is related to the gender distribution of teachers. With “passive 
teacher effects”, as described above, there will be no student–teacher gender  interaction 
effects on grading. Hence, an interaction effect in this setup indicates that teachers adjust their 
grades, intentionally or not, depending on the student’s gender. Since evaluation in languages 
to a larger extent involves subjective elements, it may be argued that it is more reasonable to 
expect a form of assessment discrimination in languages than in mathematics. 
A student–teacher gender interaction in this setup may be interpreted as a kind of teacher-
initiated discrimination in assessment of students. Since  it is reasonable to believe that 
teaching practices vary with experience, we also investigate whether the grading gap is related 
to the experience of the teachers.  
Teacher characteristics are measured at the school level. One would expect more noisy 
estimates  when one use teacher composition at school instead of matching teachers to 
                                                 
13 It is the sign of the interaction effect in Norwegian which is sensitive to whether we restrict the sample or not. 
If we restrict the sample to the two largest cities, Oslo and Bergen, the average interaction effect across all 
subjects increases to 0.10. Also in this case the interaction effect is largest for Norwegian, but insignificant at 10 
percent level.  
14 Our results are quantitatively larger than Lindahl’s (2007a) finding for Sweden. Lindahl compares high-stake 
teacher grades based on whole year assessment with low-stake national tests. We have not estimated the same 
gender grading gap directly, but this gap follows by taking the difference between the estimated gap in teacher 
grading and the estimated gap for the national test. In mathematics, our estimate comparable to Lindahl is 0.168 
(0.057‒(-0.111)), which is 0.26 standard deviations of the score difference. Lindahl’s estimate is equal to 0.11 
standard deviations of the score difference. 15 
 
students. On the other hand, we avoid biases related to strategic assignment of teachers to 
classes within schools.  
Lavy (2008) discusses in some length whether the grading gap in the Israeli case is due to 
student or teacher behavior. This is hard to investigate, however, if the teacher-student 
interaction can be described as a principal-agent relationship, as in, for example, Mechtenberg 
(2009). Then  students react on teacher strategies and teachers react on observed student 
behavior. Lavy (2008) finds that the observed  gender  gap  is sensitive  to teacher 
characteristics, in particular teacher gender, and accordingly interprets  the observed 
differences as a result of teacher behavior. Both Lavy (2008) and Lindahl (2007b) find that 
the gender grading gap is highest with male teachers. Teachers tend to assess same sex 
students more strictly than opposite sex students. In an interesting study, Bagues and Esteve-
Volart (2010) investigate whether the gender composition of recruiting committees matters 
for hiring decisions in the Spanish judiciary system. They find that male candidates are more 
likely to be hired when they are randomly assigned to a committee where the share of female 
evaluators is high.  
In Table 8 we expand equation (2) by interaction terms between female student and both the 
share of female teachers at the school and average teacher experience. Column (1) indicates 
that the gender grading gap on average across subjects are not related to the gender of the 
teachers. However, while that holds for mathematics, there is a positive interaction in English 
which is not negligible, although insignificant, and a negative interaction effect in Norwegian 
that is large in magnitude and significant at 10 percent level. Taken at face value, the result 
for Norwegian in column (10) in Table 8 implies that female teachers on average, conditional 
on exam results, assess girls 0.19 points below male teachers. The effect is equal to 0.24 
standard deviations of the score difference. For within-sample variation, an increase in the 
share of female teachers at the school from 0.3 to 0.8 changes the gender grading gap from 
0.06 score points in favor of girls to 0.03 score points in favor of boys. This result is in 
accordance with the same-sex punishment found in the literature 
Column (2) in Table 8 indicates that the gender grading gap is related to the experience of the 
teachers. Using the sample variation in average experience, the parameters imply that the 
gender grading gap across all subjects varies from 0.08 score points for minimum experience 
(10 years) to 0.03 score points for maximum experience (30 years). The impact of experience 
is larger in mathematics, but of opposite sign in Norwegian.  16 
 
Column (3) in Table 8 includes both interaction effects, which indicates that there may be 
separate interaction effects of teacher gender and experience. The subject specific models 
indicate again that teacher gender is important for the gender grading gap in Norwegian and 
that teacher experience is important for the gap in mathematics.
15 
 
6.  Conclusion and discussion 
Student achievement measures are important for  both admission prospects  in  further 
education as well as for future job prospect. Test scores are also the preferred output indicator 
in studies of education production. Hence, the objectivity and reliability of available 
performance measures are important. 
This paper has exploited information about individual student achievement for Norwegian 
students in their final year of compulsory education. On average, girls outperform boys in all 
subjects considered both at high-stake teacher grading and central exit exams. In a difference-
in-difference framework, we find gender gaps in teacher grading. In all subjects girls score 
relatively better than boys in the teacher grading than at the exams. This result contradicts the 
equilibrium theorem of Mechtenberg (2009). Our evidence indicates  that teacher grading 
practices  and teacher-student interactions cannot explain observed gender differences in 
university enrolment and wages the way she suggests. Indeed, our results indicate that the 
present evaluation system, which to a large extent relies on teacher grading, hurts boys more 
than the pure gender achievement gaps suggest. 
One cannot a priori say whether the observed gender grading gap is related to exams being 
considered by the students as the most high-stake test, the fact that exams are evaluated 
anonymously, or that exams are one-day tests. We have investigated the whether some of 
these three potential explanations are reasonable.  
Boys may perform relatively better at the central exit exam because the exam is arguably the 
most competitive environment. Then the gender grading gap should increase in the 
importance of the grades. Exploiting both that the stakes are higher in some counties than in 
others, and that one cohort conducted an additional low-stake test, we find evidence in the 
                                                 
15 One may wonder whether the interaction effects related to teacher characteristics are sensitive to the inclusion 
of interaction terms related to school choice. Expanding the models in Table 7 with the interaction term related 
to school choice included in Table 6, all estimated parameters change only marginally.   17 
 
opposite  direction.  In addition, the results regarding the low-stake test indicate that the 
anonymous vs. non-anonymous  dimension  is important. The gender grading gap has the 
opposite signs for the non-anonymous low-stake test and teacher grading. 
The gender grading gap seems to be related to characteristics of the teachers. In Norwegian, 
girls receive highest scores when assessed by a male teacher, and in mathematics girls receive 
highest grades form low-experienced teachers. One interpretation of the results is that teachers 
favor girls, either intentionally or not and either in some complex interactions with student 
behavior or not, only when stakes are high. It seems more reasonable to relate the gender 
grading gap to whether the assessment is based on one-day tests or performance over a longer 
period. For coursework elements in particular, one should expect teacher-student interactions 





Ammermueller, A. and Dolton, P. (2006): Pupil–Teacher Interaction Effects on Scholastic 
Outcomes in England and the USA, ZEW Discussion Papers 06-60. 
Bagues, M. F. and B. Esteve-Volart (2010). Can Gender Parity Break the Glass Ceiling? 
Evidence from a Repeated Randomized Experiment. Review of Economic Studies, 77, 
130-1328. 
Bonesrønning, H. (2004). ‘Can effective teacher behavior be identified?’, Economics of 
Education Review, 23(3), pp. 237–47. 
Bonesrønning, H. (2008): The Effect of Grading Practices on Gender Differences in 
Academic Performance,  Bulletin of Economic Research, 60 (3), pp. 245-264. 
Borghans, L., Meijers, H. and ter Wel, B. (2006): The Role of Noncognitive Skills in 
Explaining Cognitive Test Scores, Economic Inquiry, 46 (1), pp. 2-12.  
Dee, T. S., (2005a): A Teacher Like Me: Does Race, Ethnicity, or Gender Matter? American 
Economic Review 95(2), pp. 158–165. 
Dee, T. S., (2005b): Teachers and the Gender Gaps in Student Achievement, Working Paper 
No. W11660, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Emanuelsson, I. and Fischbein, S. (1986): Vive la Difference? A Study on Sex and Schooling, 
Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 30 (2), pp. 71–84. 
Figlio, D. N. and Lucas, M. E. (2004). ‘Do high grading standards affect student 
performance?’, Journal of Public Economics, 88(9–10), pp. 1815–34. 
Fryer, R. G., and S. D. Levitt (2009): An Empirical Analysis of the Gender Gap in 
Mathematics, NBER Working Paper 15430.  
Gneezy, U., Niederle, M. and Rustichini, A., (2003): Performance in Competitive 
Environments: Gender Differences, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), pp. 1049-
1074.  
Guiso, L., Monte, F., Sapienza, P. And Zingales, L. (2008): Culture, Gender, and Math, 
Science, 320(5880), pp. 1164-1165. 
Haraldsvik, M. (2004):  
Jacob, B. A. (2007): Test-based Accountability and Student Achievement: an Investigation of 
Differential Performance on NAEP and State Assessment, Working Paper 12817, 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Jacob, B. A. and Levitt, S. D. (2003): Rotten Apples: and Investigation of the Prevalence and 
Predictors of Teacher Cheating, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (3), pp. 843–
877. 19 
 
Kane, T. J. and Staiger, D. O., (2002): The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School 
Accountability Measures, Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic 
Association, vol. 16(4), pp. 91-114. 
Lavy, V. (2008): Do Gender Stereotypes Reduce Girls’ or Boys’ Human Capital Outcomes? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, Journal of Public Economics 92, pp. 2083-2105. 
Lindahl, E., (2007a): Comparing teachers’ assessments and national test results – evidence 
from Sweden, Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation, Working Paper 2007:24. 
Lindahl, E., (2007b): Gender and Ethnic Interactions among Teachers and Students – 
evidence from Sweden, institute for labour market policy evaluation, working paper 
2007:25. 
Machin, S. and S. McNally (2005): Gender and Student Achievement in English Schools, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21, 357-372. 
Machin, S. and K. G. Salvanes (2010): Valuing School Quality via a School Choice Reform, 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 4719. 
Mechtenberg, L. (2009): Cheap Talk in the Classroom: How Biased Grading at School 
Explains Gender Differences in Achievement, Career Choices and Wages, Review of 
Economic Studies, 76, 1431-1459. 
Niederle, M. and L. Vesterlund (2007) Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men 
Compete Too Much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 1067-1101. 
Paserman, D. M. (2007): Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environments: 
Evidence from Professional Tennis Players, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2834 –June 2007. 
Steel, C., M. (1997): A Threat in the Air – How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and 
Performance, American Psychologist, 65 (5), pp. 797–811. 
Stobart, G., Elwood, J. and Quinlan, M. (1992): Gender Bias in Examination: How Equal are 
the Opportunities? British Educational Research Journal, 18(3), pp. 261–76. 
Örs, E., F. Palomino, and E. Peyrache (2008). Performance Gender-Gap: Does Competition 
Matter? CEPR Working Paper 6891. 20 
 
Figure 1.  Percentage distribution of scores across gender, subject, and evaluation 
scheme 
1a. Mathematics, female students          1b. Mathematics, male students 
        
 
 
1c. English, female students           1d. English, male students 
        
 
1e. Norwegian, female students          1f. Norwegian, male students 
      21 
 
Table 1. A classification of evaluation schemes 
  High-stake  Low-stake 
Anonymous one-day test  Exam  (Monitoring) 
Non-anonymous one-day test  (Part of matriculation)  National test 
Non-anonymous  assessment over time  Teacher grading  (Make diagnoses) 22 
 
Table 2. Teacher grades and central exit exam results in mathematics. Female students 
  Exam result 
1  2  3  4  5  6  SUM 
Teacher assessment   
1  1.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.7 
2  2.3  14.6  2.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  19.1 
3  0.2  9.3  16.6  3.0  0.0  0.0  29.1 
4  0.0  0.8  10.0  16.3  2.0  0.0  29.1 
5  0.0  0.0  0.7  7.7  9.4  0.7  18.5 
6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  1.5  1.0  2.6 




Table 3. Teacher grades and central exit exam results in mathematics. Male students 
  Exam result 
1  2  3  4  5  6  SUM 
Teacher assessment   
1  1.7  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.5 
2  3.1  16.6  2.6  0.1  0.0  0.0  22.5 
3  0.1  9.0  16.8  3.6  0.0  0.0  29.5 
4  0.0  0.6  8.1  15.5  2.3  0.0  26.6 
5  0.0  0.0  0.5  6.1  8.9  0.7  16.2 
6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  1.5  1.1  2.7 




 Table 4. Mean comparison tests by gender and evaluation schemes, 2002–2005 
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Note. Standard deviations in brackets and t-values in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Gender gap in teacher assessment. Dependent variable is student score 
  All subjects  Mathematics  English  Norwegian 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
Female 
0.302  0.302  0.059  0.060  0.375  0.375  0.600  0.600 
(38.3)  (38.4)  (5.61)  (5.70)  (33.2)  (33.0)  (46.5)  (46.6) 
                 
Teacher assessment 
0.172  -  0.197  -  0.130  -  0.191  - 
(22.8)    (18.6)    (11.6)    (14.5)   
                 
Female  x (Teacher assessment) 
0.051  0.051  0.058  0.057  0.066  0.067  0.016  0.016 
(11.0)  (11.1)  (8.84)  (8.98)  (8.89)  (9.05)  (1.67)  (1.65) 
                 
Subject specific effects  Yes  Yes  -  -  -  -  -  - 
(School fixed effects) x (Teacher 
assessment)  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
                 
Observations  260,928  260,928  103,090  103,090  100,528  100,528  58,208  58,208 
Standard error of equation  0.977  0.975  1.023  1.020  0.967  0.964  0.854  0.850 
Note: t-values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the school level. All models include 
year fixed effects, school fixed effects, student characteristics, and teacher characteristics.  Full models for 
columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) are reported in Appendix Table A2. 
 1 
 
Table 6. Degree of school choice and gender gap in teacher assessment. Dependent variable is 
the difference in student score 
  All subjects  Mathematics  English  Norwegian 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
                     
Female  0.059  0.060  0.060  0.103  0.068  0.068  0.060  0.060  0.051  0.051 
(9.01)  (8.87)  (8.91)  (7.16)  (6.81)  (6.80)  (5.46)  (5.45)  (3.41)  (3.40) 
                     
Female  x (Free school 
choice) 
-0.019  -0.020  -0.024  -0.068  -0.026  -0.037  -0.009  0.015  -0.061  -0.074 
(2.08)  (2.15)  (1.82)  (2.68)  (2.04)  (2.30)  (0.58)  (0.75)  (3.12)  (2.77) 
                     
Sample  All  All  Restricted  Oslo and 
Bergen  All  Restricted  All  Restricted  All  Restricted 
School fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Subject fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Year fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student & teacher char.  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                     
Observations  131,868 122,422  78,173  13,447  48,463  30,441  47,424  31,208  26,983  16,838 
Standard error of equation  0.678  0.675  0.678  0.683  0.603  0.602  0.685  0.688  0.733  0.739 
Note: t-values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and  clustered at the school level. The restricted 
sample excludes municipalities with less than 250 students in the cohort on average during the empirical period 




Table 7. Gender gap and high-stake vs. low-stake tests. Dependent variable is difference in 
student score  
  All subjects  Mathematics  English  Norwegian 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                     
Female  -0.099  -0.104  -0.096  -0.096  -0.111  -0.101  0.032  0.022  -0.348  -0.310 
(7.65)  (7.88)  (5.18)  (5.14)  (8.69)  (5.12)  (1.80)  (0.81)  (15.7)  (11.1) 
                     
Female x  
(Free school choice) 
-  -  -0.020  0.051  -  0.014  -  0.017  -  0.046 
    (0.77)  (1.47)    (0.50)    (0.34)    (0.67) 
                     
Sample  All  All  All  Restricted  All  Restricted  All  Restricted  All  Restricted 
School fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student characteristics  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                     
Observations  28,688  26,664  25,452  14,829  9,370  8,948  11,262  10,688  6,053  5,839 
Standard error of eq.  0.773  0.735  0.734  0.739  0.633  0.648  0.748  0.765  0.830  0.826 
Note: Dependent variable is grade, stacking national test and central exam. t-values in parentheses are 
heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the school level. The restricted sample excludes municipalities with 
less than 250 students in the cohort in counties classified as having free school choice. 
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Table 8. Gender gap and gender interaction effects in teacher assessment. Dependent variable is difference in student score 
  All subjects  Mathematics  English  Norwegian 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
                         
Female  0.059  0.100  0.139  0.061  0.157  0.209  0.039  0.111  0.088  0.117  -0.043  0.097 
(2.40)  (3.60)  (3.19)  (1.67)  (3.80)  (2.927)  (1.04)  (2.64)  (1.33)  (2.14)  (0.69)  (1.13) 
                         
Female  x  
(Share of female teachers)  
-0.015  -  -0.051  -0.007  -  -0.070  0.052  -  0.029  -0.187  -  0.177 
(0.33)    (1.08)  (0.11)    (0.96)  (0.78)    (0.42)  (1.91)    (-1.85) 
                         
Female  x  (Mean teacher 
experience in years) 
-  -0.0024  -0.0030  -  -0.0051  -0.0058  -  -0.0022  -0.0019  -  0.0030  0.00073 
  (1.78)  (2.12)    (2.47)  (2.56)    (1.07)  (0.86)    (0.93)  (0.24) 
                         
Observations  130,464  130,464  130,464  51,545  51,545  51,545  50,264  50,264  50,264  29,104  29,104  29,104 
Standard error of equation  0.677  0.677  0.677  0.603  0.603  0.603  0.686  0.686  0.686  0.737  0.737  0.737 
Note: Dependent variable is the grade difference between teacher assessment and central exam. All models include year and school fixed effects, student characteristics, and 
teacher characteristics. t-values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the school level. Full models for columns (1), (4), (7), and (10) are reported in 





Appendix Table A1. Descriptive statistics independent variables 
 
  All subjects  Mathematics  English  Norwegian 
         








Free school choice  0.55  0.56  0.54  0.57 
Student characteristics         
    Girl  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.49 
    First generation immigrant  0.019  0.019  0.018  0.019 
    Second generation immigrant   0.018  0.018  0.017  0.018 
    Student living with both parents  0.69  0.69  0.69  0.69 
    Higher education Father  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.29 
    Higher education Mother  0.32  0.32  0.31  0.32 
















Teacher characteristics         
































         
Obervations  130,464  51,545  50,264  29,104 2 
 
Table A2.  Estimation results, full models 
  Models in Table 5    Models in Table 8 
  (1)  (3)  (5)  (7)    (1)  (4)  (7)  (10) 
Dependent variable  Student score    Difference in student score 
  All 
subjects  Math  English  Norwegian    All 
subjects  Math  English  Norwegian 
Female, assessment, and choice                   
    Female  0.302  0.059  0.375  0.600    0.059  0.061  0.039  0.117 
(38.3)  (5.61)  (33.2)  (46.5)    (2.40)  (1.67)  (1.04)  (2.14) 
    Teacher assessment  0.172  0.197  0.130  0.191    -  -  -  - 
(22.8)  (18.6)  (11.6)  (14.5)           
    Female  x  
    (Teacher assessment) 
0.051  0.058  0.066  0.016    -  -  -  - 
(11.0)  (8.84)  (8.89)  (1.67)           
    Female  x  
    (Share of female teachers)  
-  -  -  -    -0.015  -0.007  0.053  -0.187 
          (0.33)  (0.11)  (0.78)  (1.91) 
    English 
0.373  -  -  -    -0.051  -  -  - 
(31.9)          (3.91)       
    Norwegian 
0.300  -  -  -    -0.024  -  -  - 
(29.3)          (1.67)       
Student characteristics                   
    First generation immigrant 
-0.298  -0.406  -0.206  -0.258    0.006  0.049  0.003  -0.077 
(12.8)  (10.8)  (5.77)  (6.82)    (0.37)  (2.35)  (0.11)  (2.23) 
    Second generation immigrant  
-0.122  -0.202  -0.055  -0.067    0.031  0.039  0.055  0.0001 
(4.12)  (5.13)  (1.14)  (1.47)    (1.96)  (2.00)  (2.19)  (0.001) 
    Student living with both parents 
0.266  0.363  0.186  0.229    0.042  0.035  0.043  0.043 
(41.2)  (34.1)  (20.5)  (24.1)    (8.68)  (5.98)  (5.65)  (4.21) 
    Higher education Father 
0.438  0.496  0.414  0.362    0.016  -0.0002  0.020  0.032 
(54.7)  (41.7)  (37.3)  (29.1)    (3.29)  (0.03)  (2.36)  (2.88) 
    Higher education Mother 
0.405  0.452  0.384  0.353    0.024  -0.004  0.041  0.046 
(46.2)  (33.0)  (28.2)  (28.8)    (4.96)  (0.57)  (5.32)  (4.12) 
    Income Father 
0.004  0.003  0.006  0.008    0.0004  0.0001  0.0008  0.0018 
(1.82)  (1.21)  (3.58)  (3.78)    (1.55)  (1.13)  (1.09)  (2.03) 
    Income Mother 
0.025  0.021  0.034  0.024    0.003  0.0002  0.007  0.006 
(3.73)  (2.13)  (3.85)  (4.41)    (2.61)  (0.23)  (2.99)  (2.36) 
Teacher characteristics                   
    Mean experience in years 
-0.004  0.003  -0.013  -0.022    0.001  0.003  -0.001  -0.038 
(0.85)  (0.42)  (1.66)  (1.55)    (0.11)  (0.35)  (0.13)  (2.11) 
    Share female 
0.019  -0.115  -0.045  0.047    0.153  0.063  0.149  -0.710 
(0.17)  (-0.55)  (-0.27)  (0.11)    (1.16)  (0.24)  (0.49)  (1.21) 
    Share without children 
-0.006  0.260  -0.109  -0.520    0.266  0.216  0.268  0.917 
(0.05)  (1.37)  (0.52)  (1.54)    (2.01)  (0.81)  (0.99)  (2.01) 
    Share married 
0.132  0.153  0.290  -0.275    0.065  -0.023  0.237  0.348 
(1.48)  (0.91)  (1.82)  (0.97)    (0.54)  (0.10)  (0.99)  (0.68) 
Year                   
    2003  0.009  -0.006  0.003  0.055    0.029  0.040  0.013  -0.103 
  (0.86)  (0.25)  (0.13)  (1.07)    (2.08)  (1.28)  (0.40)  (1.93) 
    2004  0.045  -0.004  0.055  0.082    0.027  0.045  0.034  0.010 
  (3.65)  (0.16)  (2.40)  (1.54)    (1.62)  (1.37)  (1.00)  (0.17) 
    2005  0.031  -0.061  0.092  0.057    0.096  0.207  -0.025  0.072 
  (2.08)  (2.29)  (3.34)  (1.06)    (5.02)  (6.27)  (0.60)  (1.15) 
School fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                   
Observations  260,928  103,090  100,528  58,208    130,464  51,545  50,264  29,104 
Standard error of equation  0.977  1.023  0.967  0.854    0.677  0.603  0.686  0.737 
Note t-values in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the school level. 
 